IMT Nuremberg Archives

H – 790

International Court of Justice

H0790-0002

Ri. Exhibit Nr. 215 a

504

Copy

Iceland.

May 10, 1940. Communique of the Foreign Office:

Since the German invasion of Denmark, one has to figure on an invasion of Iceland.

It is clear that the government of Iceland with its weak forces would not be in a position to oppose a German attack.

The British Government has decided to anticipate the possibility of a German invasion in Iceland and therefore has landed British troops in Iceland on the morning of May 10 ..

On July 8, 1941 President Roosevelt announced in a message to the Congress that American Marines had landed in Iceland.

These are supposed to reinforce English troops or possibly replace them.

[illegible] copy:

copy certified by:

signed: Dr. Martin Horn

Attorney-at-law.

H0790 - 0003

Ri. Exhibit No. 215 b

519

Copy

Greenland.

It was anncunced cn April 10, 1941 that Praesident Rccsevelt, in crder tc safeguard Greenland against an attack, had placed her under American prctectien.

The gcvernment cf the United States expressly repeats that she reccgnizes Denmarks scvereign rights over Greenland.

Cut cf the ccnsideration that in ccnsequence cf the present war in Eurcpe the danger exists that Greenland cculd be made the spring-bcard fcr an attack against natiens cf the American ccntinent, the gcvernment cf the United States takes cn the task, tc assist Greenland in the maintenance cf its present status..

I herewith certify the ccrrectness cf this ccpy:

signed: Dr. Martin Hcrn

Attorney-at-law.

H0790 – 0004

Ri. Exhibit Nr. 216a

509

C o p y

from: Documents of German Politics, volume 8 I

4. Memorandum of the German Government of the Reich to the Norwegian Government dated April 9, 1940.

Pages 21,22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29.

.....

Germany on her part has been trying to maintain the rights of neutral States by such means, as would restrict the warfare to such zones of the ocean as lay between Germany and her enemies. In contrast to this, England, became because of her intention of diverting the danger from her Icelands and of cutting off at the same time Germany's trade and commerce from the neutral world, has increasingly carried the naval warfare into the waters of the Neutrales. In the execution of this typical British war conduct, England in ever increasing degree and in flagrant breach of International Law, has carried out warlike activities at sea and also,in the air, in the waters and territory under sovereignty of Denmark and Norway.

Germany had anticipated this development since the beginning of the war. By her economic policy in the interior and abroad she has known how to prevent the attempt of the British Hunger Blockade against the German people and the cutting off of German commerce from the neutral states.

This made increasingly clear the total break-down of the British policy of blockade during the last month.

This development as well as the hopelessness of a direct attack on the German fortifications in the West and the ever increasing fear in England and France of a successful German counter attack at sea and in the air

H0790 - 0005

have led to the result, that both countries tried to as much as possible effect with all means a transfer of the theatre of war to the neutral continent inside and outside of Europe.

It is self-evident that England and France, in doing so have in mind in the first place the territories of the small European States in accordance with British traditions. The English and French statesmen have proclaimed quite openly during the last months the expansion of the war to these territories as their basic strategy in their war conduct.

The first opportunity hereto was offered by the Russian-Finnish conflict. The British and the French Government have declared publicly that they were willing to interfere in the conflict between the Soviet Union and Finnland with military force and to use for that purpose the territory of the Northern States as a bases of operations. Only the quick conclusion of the peace in the North , which occurred against their desires and expectations, prevented them already at that time from carrying out their decision..... The Government of the Reich has documentary proof i its possesion that England and France decided together, to carry out the action on the territory of the Northern States, if necessary even against the will of these States. .....

The Government of the Reich has obtained possession of irrefutable proof that England and France intended to occupy certain territories of the Northern States by surprise, within the next days.

The Nrothern States on their part, did not only not resist the transgressions of England and France up to now, but have permitted serious interferences

H0790 – 0006

in their rights of sovereigntyy without takin, corresponding counter measures.

Therefore, the Government of the Reich must assume that the Royal Norwegian Government will take the same attitude towards the actions now planned by England and France, the execution of which is pending. But, even if the Royal Norwegian Government were willing to undertake counter measures, the Government of the Reich is fully aware of the fact that the Norwegian military forces would not be in a state to successfully oppose the English-French actions.

The Government of the Reich under no circumstances can permit in this decisive phase of the fight for existence of the German nation, which has been imposed on her by England and France Scandinavia to being made a theatre of war by the Western Powers against Germany and the Norwegian people, be it directly or indirectly, being missused in the war against Germany.

Germany is not willing to wait for or to accept such a realization of the plans of her enemies, passively. Therefore, the Government of the Reich has started, beginning to day, certain military operations, which will lead to the occupation of strategically important points on Norwegian national territory. With this, the Government of the Reich assumes the protection of the Kingdom of Norway for the duration of this war. It has decided, to defend from now on with all the power at its command the peace in the North against any English-French attack and to safeguard it conclusively.

.....

Copy certified by:

signed: Dr. Martin Horn

Attorney-at-law.

H0790 – 0007

Ri. Exhibit No. 216b

5/R

C o p y

from: Documents of German Politics, Volume 8 I

Page 32

Memorandum of the German Reich Cabinet to the Danish Government of the 9 April 1940.

The s a m e a s Document No. 4

(Memorandum to the Norwegian Government)

H0790 – 0008

D 629

5/5

Copy

Top Secret

The Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht
WF./Department L. No.22126/40/G.K./IV

Berlin, 3 April 1940.

To the
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Dear Mr. von Ribbentrop!

The military occupation of Denmark and Norway has been prepared for some time by the High Command of the Wehrmacht at the order of the Fuehrer. Therefore, the High Command had sufficient time to deal with all questions which have to be solved in order to carry out this operation. The time which is allotted to you for the political preparation of the action is comparatively much shorter. Therefore, I believe I am acting according to your own desires when I enclose not only those wishes of the Wehrmacht which for purely military reasons would have to be fulfilled by the Governments in Oslo, Kopenhagen and Stockholm, but when I also convey a number of wishes which touch upon the Wehrmacht only indirectly, which are however, of greatest importance for the achieving of your task.

May I ask in the interest of establishing full agreement on the action that a personal contact between the German plenipotentiaries assigned for Oslo and Kopenhagen and the military commanders be brought about as soon as possible. The overall direction of the military operation

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lies in the hands of von Falkenhorst, General Inf., commander of group XXI. Under him the Higher Command on Special Assignment XXXI, commander Kaupisch, General Air Corps will direct Denmark's occupation.

In complying with the explicit directive by the Fuehrer, may I also ask that the circle of people participating in the preparations be limited to the utmost. Aside from the Foreign Office and the High Command of the Wehrmacht no other top Reich agencies and other offices are concerndd, as a matter of principle. It is only on the day on which the occupation takes place that the necessary notification of the top Reich agencies will be effected by the High Command.

Heil Hitler

Respectfully yours,

signed: K

Copy certifed by:

(signed) (illegible)

Dr. Horn

Attorney-at-Law.

H0790 - 0010

Ri. Exhibit Nr. 217

~~544~~
515

C o p y

from: Documents on German Politics, Volume 8 I

5. Statement of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs von Ribbentrop before Berlin representatives of the foreign press in the Bundesrat Room of the Foreign Office on the morning of 9 April 1940.

Pages 34, 35, 36.

.....

The Reich Cabinet received a report some time ago to the effect that English and French general- and -admiral staff officers are staying allover the territory of Norway in order to designate and prepare landing places and to plan an advance to the South.

.....

In the English-French note to the Norwegian Government of 8 April a new international law is proclaimed in accordance with which the belligerent power has the right to undertake an action which will balance the situation created by the illegal act of the enemy.

We have adopted this thesis .....

Copy certified by:

(signature illegible)

Dr. Horn

Attorney-at-law.

H0790 - 0011

PS 004

516

C o p y

The Political Preparation

of the

N o r w a y - A c t i o n

(Excerpts)

.....

Page 4,2nd par. As follows from the enclosed notes in the files, the reports forwarded by Quisling, especially through his confidant and representative in Germany, Hagelin, concerning active interference by the Western powers in Norway with the latter country's toleration became more acute. These communications, always substantiated in detail by Quisling's confidants were always somewhat in opposition to the opinion of the German Legation in Oslo which counted upon the will of the then Norwegian Government Nygaardsvolku to remain neutral and was convinced of that Government's readiness to defend its intention of remaining neutral. This was also the opinion of the Foreign Office as shown in enclosed note in the files dated 8 January concerning a discussion between Amtsleiter (head of a central regional office) Scheidt and Geheimrat Grundherr.

Page 5,1rst par. ..... In the total report of Amtsleiter Scheidt concerni
13 th line
the time from 20 January to 20 February .... the demand of the English for air bases in Norway and freedom of action in the Norwegian territorial waters is pointed out. Although the Norwegian Government rejected this demand, an agreement, however, was reached to the effect that the Norwegia Government would answer to English encroachments only in the form of paper protests. The observation and confirmation of these reports have brought to light time and again through Quisling. In complete opposition to this interpretation the Legation fought for the opposite opinion even after the Altmark affair and stuck to its opinion of the Norwegians' good will and the minister used the signing of the Norwegian -German Trade Agreement

H0790 - 0012

as an extraordinarily weighty argument for his stand and already saw a certain dependance of the Norwegian Government upon the Greater German Reich.

.....

Page 8,last par.

Confirming all these reports made by Quisling and his confidants and in opposition to the opinion of the German Legation in Oslo and the Foreign Office which had been adhered to until the end, on 8 April the Allies lifted their arm for the first strong blow, the preliminary step for Norway's occupation which had been intended by them. On the night of 7/8 April they laid mine fields along the Norwegian coast and informed the world public about it .....

Copy certified by:

(signature illegible)

Dr. Martin Horn

Attorney-at-Law

We, Annemarie C. Catlin, Theodore Lit, Harry Frohmann hereby certify that we are thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages and that above is a true and correct translation of Document 39-PS 004.

March 22th, 1946

Annemarie C. Catlin X 046172
Theodore Lit X 046185
Harry M. Frohmann X 046322

HO790-0013

Ri - Exhibit No. 218

218

COPY

from "Dokumente der deutschen Politik"

Vol. I, pp. 142-150.

MEMORANDUM FROM THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO THE BELGIAN AND DUTCH GOVERNMENTS 1940.

The Reich Government has for a long time had no doubts as to the chief aim of British and French war policy. It consists in the spreading of the war to other countries, and of the misuse of their peoples as auxiliary and mercenary troops for England and France.

As the Reich Government has long been aware, the true aim of England and France is the carefully prepared and now immediately imminent attack on Germany in the West, so as to advance through Belgium and Holland to the region of the Ruhr.

Germany has recognized and respected the stipulated inviolabilit of Belgium and Holland, it being of course that these two countries, in the event of a war of Germany against England and France, would maintain the strictest neutrality.

Belgium and the Netherlands have not fulfilled this condition. To be sure they have attempted hitherto fact to maintain an outward appea ance of neutrality, but in both countries have shown a one-sided partialit for Germany's opponents and have furthered their designs.

On the basis of the evidence before them and particularly of the attached reports from the Ministry of the Interior of the 20 March 1940 and the German High Command of the 4 May 1940, the German Govern-ment confirm the following:.....

H0790 - 0014

A similarly open and exposed invasion gate-way for the British Air Force is the Netherlands coastal area.

The German Government has continually provided the Royal Netherlands Government with evidence of the infringement of Netherlands neutrality by British aircraft. Since the outbreak of the war British airmen have almost daily appeared over German territory coming from the direction of the Netherlands. One hundred and twenty-seven such British flights over Germany were verified in every detail and the Royal Netherlands Government were duly notified. Actually, however, the number is much greater, it amounts to the number of cases notified. Also in all these further instances of flights there is no doubt that the aircraft concerned were British .

H0790 - 0015

Ri-Exhibit No. 218
(cont'd)

520

The great number of flights, and the fact that no effective counter-measures were taken by the Royal Netherlands Government, clearly show that the British Air Force systematically used Netherlands territory as an outward passage for their operations against Germany, with the knowledge and indulgence of the Royal Netherlands Government.

8.

Evidence in the hands of the German Government shows that English and French preparations on Belgian and Netherlands territory for their attack against Germany are already far advanced.

Thus for some time already, all obstacles on the Belgian border towards France which might hinder the entry of the English and French invasion army have been secretly removed. Air fields in Belgium and the Netherlands have been reconnoitred by English and French officers and extensions effected. Belgium has made transport facilities available at the frontier and recently advance parties of staff personnel and units of the French and English army have arrived in various parts of Belgium and the Netherlands. These facts, together with further information which has accumulated in the last few days, furnish conclusive proof that the English and French attack against Germany is imminent, and that this thrust will be directed against the Ruhr through Belgium and the Netherlands.

The picture of the Belgian and Netherlands attitude, as presented by these indisputable facts, is clear and unequivocal. Both countries from the outbreak of war, contrary to the declaration made by their governments, secretly placed themselves on the side of England and France, thus on the side of the powers which had decided to attack Germany and had declared war on her. Although this attitude was pointed out to the Belgian Foreign Minister in all seriousness several times by Germany, it did not make the slightest difference. On the contrary, the Belgian Defence Minister recently made public declarations in the Belgian Chamber which in no uncertain way contained the admission that all steps necessary for joint action against Germany had been agreed upon between the General Staffs of Belgium, France and England.

H0790 - 0016

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If, in spite of this, Belgium and the Netherlands continue to proclaim a policy of independence and neutrality, it can, in the light of established facts, only be regarded as an attempt to conceal the real intentions of Belgian and Netherlands policy.

In this situation, the Reich Government can however, no longer doubt that Belgium and the Netherlands are resolved, not only to tolerate the impending Anglo-French attack, but to favour it in every way and that the agreements of the General Staffs of the two countries with the Anglo-French General Staff exclusively serve this purpose. . . . .

In this struggle for existence forced upon the German people by England and France, the Reich Government is not disposed to await submissively the attack by England and France and to allow them to carry the war over Belgium and the Netherlands into German territory. It has therefore now issued the command to German troops to ensure the neutrality of these countries by all the military means at the disposal of the Reich.

A certified true copy:

s/ Dr. Martin Horn
Attorney at Law

H0790 - 0017

Ri Exhibit No. 219

521

COPY

from "Dokumente der deutschen Politik"

Vol. 8/1. pp. 150 - 151.

MEMORANDUM FROM THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO THE LUXEMBOURG GOVERNMENT

DATED, MAY, 1940

The Reich Government has been reliably informed that England and France, in the course of their policy of spreading the war, have decided to attack Germany in the near future through Belgian and Dutch territory. Belgium and the Netherlands who, secretly violating their neutrality, have long since taken the side of the enemies of Germany, not only do not intend to prevent this attack but to favour it. The facts which go to prove this have been stated in detail in a memorandum which is being handed to the Royal Belgian Government and the Royal Government of the Netherlands, a copy of which is enclosed herewith.

In defence against the imminent attack, the German troops have now received the order to safeguard the neutrality of these two countries with all the power at the disposal of the Reich.

The offensive, decided upon by England and France in agreement with Belgium and the Netherlands will also involve the territory of Luxembourg. To repulse the attack the Reich Government has therefore been forced to extend its military operations to Luxembourg territory also.

It has been known to the Grand-Ducal Government of Luxembourg that the Reich was prepared to respect the neutrality and integrity of Luxembourg, provided that the other powers which are neighbours of the Grand Duchy would also take the same attitude. Negotiations for agreements to the effect between the powers concerned, which seemed to be almost completed in the summer of 1939, were then broken off by France! This breaking off of the negotiations by France finds its explanation in the military decisions now taken by her together with the other enemies of Germany, an explanation which does not need any further illustration.

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Ri Exhibit No. 219
(cont.)

522

.... The Reich Government, on its part, gives the assurance to the Grand-Ducal Government of Luxembourg that Germany has no intention, now or in the future, of interfering with the territorial integrity or political independence of the Grand Dutchy.

Certified true copy:

s/ Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at Law

H0790 - 0019

Ri-Exhibit No. 220

Copy

523

from "Dokumente der deutschen Politik"

Volume 8 / I Page No. 152.

Statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs von RIBBENTROP before representatives of the German and Foreign Press in the Auditorium of the Federated Council (Bundesratssaal) of the Foreign Office in Berlin in the Morning of 10 May 1940.

Gentlemen!

England and France have finally dropped their mask. After the invasion of Scandinavia had failed, the Mediterranean was alerted. This large scale deceptive manoeuvre was to hide England(s true aims: the penetration into the German Ruhr via Belgium and Holland. This attack, as has come to the attention of the government of the Reich, has long been secretly prepared with the knowledge of Belgium and Holland. News of the last days about English troop shipments destined for Dutch and Belgian ports are self-evident.

The government of the Reich learned yesterday that England has informed the governments of Belgium and Holland of imminent landings of English troops on Belgian and Dutch territory. This information coincides with the incontestible evidence in the hands of the Reich government on the grouping of the English and French Army and on the imminent attack on the Ruhr via Belgian and Dutch territory.

The Fuehrer is not willing to expose the Ruhr - this important center of German economy - to a new English-French aggression. He has therefore decided to take the neutrality of Belgium and Holland against English-French aggressors from now on under his protection.

The authenticity of this copy is confirmed.

s/ Dr. Martin HORN

t/ Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at Law.

H0790-0020

Exhibit Ri. No.221

COPY

524+525

from the White Book Number 6 (Foreign Office 1939/41)

The Secret Documents of the French General Staff.

No.1.

General Lelong, Military Attache to the French Embassy in London, to the chief of the French General Staff of National Defence.

Extract (Translation of Facsimile on page 159).

London, 5 May 1939.

..... II. Land, Air and Colonial Questions.

Intervention in Belgium. The uncertain nature of the conditions of a possible intervention on our part in Belgium was readily recognized by the British Delegation. It was agreed that with the reservation of avoiding a battle on the Belgian plains, we should prepare the organization of our defence at least on the Belgian Scheldt, through the Albert Canal would be preferable.

On the request of the British Delegation the following points have been considered:

1. The possibility of intervention along the line Antwerp-Brussels-Namur, supposing that it were possible to organize such a position in good time;

2. The importance of holding Belgian and Dutch territory as a base for a resumption of the offensive against Germany.

However far our intervention might take us into these territories, it was agreed that the Franco-British air force units should primarily be employed, immediately the need arises, for attacking the German columns advancing into Belgium and Holland, and that these air force units should operate from bases on French or British territory.

. . . . . .

Certified True Copy.

Dr. M. Horn.

H0790 – 0021

Exhibit Ri. No.222-228.

COPY

526

From the White Book No.6 (Foreign Office 1939/41)

The Secret Documents of the French General Staff

No.3.

General Gamelin, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, to M. Daladier, the French Premier and Minister for National Defence and War.

(Translation of Facsimile on page 170)

Very Secret. Paris, 1 September 1939.

I consider it to be my duty to put before you in writing the point of view which I had the honour of outlining to you verbally regarding the question of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg (and incidentally of the Netherlands).

Certainly I appreciate the point of view which the French Government have adopted, and which has been expressed in detail in the last conversations with the Governments of these three countries. From a moral point of view, France could have taken up no other attitude than to guarantee their neutrality, and to guarantee that we would not march into their territory unless called upon to do so by them. She has no alternative but to respect her obligations.

It is none the less necessary to realize that the present attitude of Belgium operates entirely in Germany's favour.

From the point of view of offensive action by France against Germany, while between the Rhine and the Moselle we come up against a very powerful system of fortifications along a front of about 78 miles, we would have a front of more than double that length between the Moselle and the Meuse (especially if we could pass through the Dutch territory of Maestricht). There we would find much more favourable ground for our direction of attack, less powerful fortifications, hardly begun in certain parts, and much more valuable objectives. The utilization of Belgium would provide us with suitable air bases for operations against the provinces of the Lower Rhine, with industrial centres and possibly large towns. This would be the only way in which we could furnish Poland with powerful, definitely effective and relatively rapid aid, for even by only widening our front of attack we

H0790 - 0022

527

would be tying down stronger forces.

The neutrality of Spain, and particularly that of Italy, would allow us sufficient means, without even waiting for British help, for effective action in this direction.

It is hardly necessary to add that, even from a defensive point of view, in the event of later action by Germany against us through Belgium and the Netherlands, it would be to our advantage to go to the support of the Belgian forces in the defence of such important obstacles as the Albert Canal, the fortress of Liege, the Meuse and even, in advance of the line of the Meuse, through the easily-defended country that reaches from Liege to the Moselle through the difficult zone of Malmedy, and also, if possible, the steeply-banked reaches of the Our and the Sauer. This position would enable us to retain all the advantages of Belgium as an air base and would keep the war away from the French frontiers, particularly the rich provinces of the North. On the other hand, should the Belgians not call for our aid until the very moment that they were attacked by the Germans, no doubt they would not have the means, in point of numbers and of military strength, of holding their front effectively before it was pierced, and we should have to run all the risks of open warfare, with the added difficulty of supporting retreating armies; a very difficult task against modern mechanized forces and aircraft.

With a man like King Albert, who had given proof of his capacity, it would have been possible to use such point-blank terms. Is there anyone in Belgium -- I do not say now, but when the time comes -- capable of understanding such language? I cannot say. But it would be regrettable if no men could be found conscious of the destiny of their country and convinced of the fact that, if Germany emerged victorious from the war, Belgiumwould, to say the least, come under the complete subjection of the Reich. I felt that it was necessary that the French Government should be aware of the opinion of the Command on this point.(1)

GAMELIN.

H0790 - 0023

(1) In a later note, dated 16 November, General Gamelin returns to this theme in the following words: "For France it is of very vital importance to march into Belgium. By so doing we should transfer the theatre of war beyond our frontiers and be in the best position to protect our industrial areas in the North. This, however, is still more important for Great Britain: it would thus be impossible for the enemy to make use of the air and submarine bases which he would find in Belgium, and moreover, if our forces occupied Belgium, Britain could further advance her lines of air defence."

****

Certified True Copy.

Dr. M. Horn.

HO790 - 0024

Exhibit Ri. No.223

529

COPY

from the White Book No.6 (Foreign Office 1939/41)

Secret Documents of the French General Staff.

No.12.

M. Bargeton, French Ambassador in Brussels, to the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Telegram

(Translation of Facsimile on page 194)

No. 786.
Very Secret.

Brussels, 9 November 1939.
12.45 p.m.

M. Spaak informed me that there was a question in which he personally was very much engrossed, and its solution appeared to him to be so delicate a matter that he wished to lose no time in recommending it to Your Excellency's attention, namely, the command of those troops which would, when occasion arose, co-operate with the Belgian Army, which in its turn would be commanded by the King himself. It could actually be foreseen that the Belgian divisions, now already drawn up in full force, would have no support and reserves in general, other than the French and British troops.

Bargeton.

****

Certified True Copy.

Dr. M. Horn.

H0790-0025

Exhibit Ri. No.224

COPY

530

from the White Book No.6 (Foreign Office 1939/41)

Secret Documents of the French General Staff

No.13.

Colonel Laurent, Military Attache to the French Embassy in Brussels, to the French Ministry of War.

Telegram

(Translation of Facsimile on page 195)

Secret

Brussels, 11 November 1939, 5.21p.m.

Reply to telegram 169 Army.

1. Nothing -- I confirm that despite my insistence, no work whatsoever was done in the Wavre-Gembloux-Rhisnes sector. Only one reconnaissance was made in which the railway line was considered as a partial anti-tank obstacle.

2. The small valley of the Thyle is a good obstacle; the line running through the plain via Fleurus, which is shorter, would tactically therefore be preferable to that of Gembloux but it would be a pity to abandon the plateau Namur -- an important position where the Ardennes troops are stationed.

Conclusion: Strategically unfavourable, when taking Belgian plans into account.

Colonel Michoux, at present at Army Headquarters, carried out a patrol.

Telegrams Nos. 148-149-150 CH.

****

Certified True Copy.

Dr. M. Horn.

H0790-0026

Exhibit Ri. No.225

531

COPY

from the White Book No.6 (Foreign Office 1939/41)

Secret Documents of the French General Staff

No.14.

General Gamelin, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, to General Lelong, Military Attache to the French Embassy in London.

Telegram

(Translation of Facsimile on page 195)

Very Secret
No. 88 Cab/D.N.

Headquarters, 13 November 1939, 3 p.m.

Reply to your telegram 812.

Inform British Delegation that French Command fully maintains principle of planned action including occupation Scheldt islands. This occupation constitutes indispensable protection of left flank of Allied forces whether or not they advance to the Dyle or only the Scheldt.

Besides it represents only possible liaison with southern wing of Dutch defence in region Bergen op Zoom-Rosendaal if impossible to drive it further eastwards. Moreover it is imperative to hold the islands of Scheldt position be occupied, so that Allied forces may not be attacked in the flank by enemy troops should they occupy above mentioned islands, and so that Fortress of Antwerp itself may not possibly be taken under fire by ships anchored in eastern arm of Scheldt. The Dutch forces protecting Fortress of Holland must be responsible for covering mouths of Meuse and Waal.

Should occupation of islands not suffice to enable fullest use of Scheldt to Antwerp, it will make limited traffic possible or at least supplies to Fortress Antwerp, and thus relieve railways.

Occupation might moreover only be undertaken with Holland's acquiescence.

Gamelin.

****

Certified True Copy.

Dr. M. Horn.

H0790 – 0027

Exhibit Ri. No.226

COPY

532

from the White Book No.6 (Foreign Office 1939/41)

Secret Documents of the French General Staff

No.15.

Colonel Laurent, Military Attache to the French Embassy in Brussels, to the French Ministry of War.

Report

(Translation of Facsimile on page 198)

Secret
No.854/S.

Brussels, 20 November 1939.

I have the honour to confirm my telegram of today. On Saturday it was at last decided to construct Wavre-Namur position and thus fill in the existing gap in the sector Antwerp-Namur.

As already advised by me the railway line Brussels-Namur is being taken as base. In the northern sector, however, in front of the railway line a connection has to be established. Numerous "Cointet" tank obstacles are being erected.

I shall not fail to keep a close watch on the work.

E. Laurent.

****

Certified True Copy.

Dr. M. Horn.

H0790 - 0028

Exhibit Ri. No.227

COPY

533

from the White Book No.6 (Foreign Office 1939/41)

Secret Documents of the French General Staff.

No.16.

General Laurent, Military Attache to the French Embassy in Brussels, to the French Ministry of War.

Report

(Translation of Facsimile on page 199)

Secret
No. 1065/S

Brussels, 16 December 1939.

Re:
Work on the Position
Wavre-Namur

I have the honour of informing you that work is continuing on the position Wavre-Namur;

On 16 December the construction of the obstacle between Gembloux and Namur is continued, by modification of the transverse section of the route, and by the erection of "Cointet" anti-tank obstacles.

The works is likewise proceeding on the north-eastern front of the fortified position of Namur, and concrete pill-boxes are being constructed in the district of Suarlee.

This information is the result of reconnaissance made today. It confirms the indications just supplied me by the Minister and by the Chief of the General Staff. Both of them confirmed that the work of obstruction would be completed at the beginning of January.

E. Laurent.

****

Certified True Copy.

Dr. M. Horn.

H0790 - 0029

Exhibit Ri. No.228

534

COPY

From the White Book No.6 (Foreign Office 1939/41)

Secret Documents of the French General Staff

No. 35.

Documents relating to the meeting of the French War Committee of 9 April 1940.

(Translation of Facsimile on page 265)

Very Secret

(a) Minutes of Meeting

The War Committee met on 9 April at the Palais de l'Elysee, under the chairmanship of M. Albert Lebrun, President of the Republic.

Present:

M. Paul Reynaud, Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs.
M. Edouard Daladier, Minister for National Defence and War.
M. Campinchi, Minister for the Navy.
M. Laurent-Eynac, Air Minister.
M. Mandel, Minister for the Colonies.
General Gamelin
General Vuillemin
General Georges

The Premier communicates the latest information received on the situation. He is of the opinion that immediate action should be taken in the Narvik area, the iron ore being of capital importance for the outcome of the war. He insists that the dispatch of the Audet division to Brest should be accelerated and that their arms should immediately be shipped. He directs the Committee's attention to the fact that the race between Germany and the Allies has begun.

Admiral Darlan proposes:

1. the advance into Belgium,

2. the laying of mines in the rivers,

3. the commencement of local attacks on the north-eastern front.

The Premier requests the opinion of General Gamelin on these proposals.

General Gamelin declares that he is in favour of action in Belgium.

When the Premier points out to him that the enemy has a double superiority over us in aircraft and in man-power, General Gamelin confirms his

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affirmative reply, General Georges seconding him.

The Minister for National Defence and War expresses his opinion, which is entirely in favour of the operation.

The following resolution is carried unanimously:

(1) that the Government shall endeavour to obtain the consent of the Belgian Government for the proposed operation in Belgium.

(2) that, subject to this consent being obtained, the operation will be carried out.

(3) That if this operation is carried out, mines will be laid in the rivers.

(4) that the Government shall inform the Norwegian Government that France will afford them aid and assistance.

(5) that the Premier, the Minister for National Defence and War, and Admiral Darlan shall leave for London in the afternoon.

(b) Letter from General Gamelin to M. Daladier, Minister for National Defence and War, with enclosure

Very Secret
100 372 Cab. D.N. 9 April 1940.

This morning's meeting, which was a meeting of the War Committee, cannot be the object of complete minutes since no representative of the Secretariat of the Supreme Council for National Defence was present.

However, in view of the gravity of the resolutions passed, it seems necessary to me to keep record of them.

I enclose herewith some draft minutes which briefly state them and which, if you approve, could be passed on to the Premier.

I should, moreover, like to add, which I had no time to do this morning, that it seems to me important not to raise the question of our entry into Netherland and Luxemburg territories at the very outset.

On the one hand, especially in order to keep everything secret, there is no advantage for us in raising these two questions beforehand, and,

on the other hand, the entry into Belgium is the best preparation for our entry into the Netherlands, of which it forms the first stage, and,

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536 + 537

lastly, as far as Luxemburg is concerned, its territory, apart from covering the industrial centre of Longwy, is of only secondary importance for the general conduct of the war, whilst in the early stage Luxemburg covers our entry into Belgium.

It is, of course, obvious that we must be ready to deal with these two other problems subsequently without delay.

Gamelin.

Draft Minutes of the meeting of the War Committee
on 9 April 1940.

Very Secret.

After a rapid examination of the general situation resulting from the launching of the German attack on Denmark and Norway, the following was decided:

I. The Admiral of the Fleet and Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces directs operations, as far as the entire French forces are concerned, until the moment when, the land forces having been disembarked, this command will pass on land to the military authorities of the land forces in accordance with the conditions agreed upon with the British.

As far as the general conduct of the war is concerned, it is of the greater importance to occupy the port of Narvik as soon as possible and to seize the mines at Vallivare. The Admiral of the Fleet will attempt to accelerate operations with this object in view by getting into touch with the British Admiralty.

II. With a view to resuming the initiative in the operations, France must attempt to make Belgium understand the importance for her of the advance of our troops taking place before the German attack.

. . . . . .

Certified True Copy.

Dr. M. Horn.

H0790-0032

Exhibit Ri No. 229

COPY

538

from the White Book No. 5

Further documents concerning the Anglo-French policy of extending the war. The General Staff conversations between Britain and France on the one hand and Belgium and Holland on the other hand.

Summary

Footnote (page 5)

The note transmitted by the Belgian Foreign Ministry of that time, dated March 6, 1936, reads as follows:

To His Excellency Monsieur van Zeeland, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Minister for Foreign Trade.

Your Excellency,

By the exchange of correspondence of September 10 and 15, 1920, between the French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and the Belgian Prime Minister, the French Government and the Government of His Majesty the King of the Belgians gave their assent to the military agreement signed on September 7, 1920. According to the wording of the correspondence which passed between the two Governments in 1920 and was recorded in Geneva, the object of the agreement of 1920 was to reinforce the guarantees of peace and security resulting from the League of Nations Pact. The agreement established the technical directives for military cooperation between France and Belgium in the event of an unprovoked attack by Germany.

In 1925 a treaty was concluded at Locarno which embodied the guarantees provided for in 1920 in a more complete and precise form. The treaty was signed by the President of the Republic and received the assent of the Chambers.

This treaty represents one of the most essential elements of Belgium's international status, and the obligations therein laid down, together with the obligations resulting from the Pact of the League of Nations, are the only ones which bind France and Belgium in respect of guarantees and assistance.

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Exhibit Ri No. 229 (cont.) 551

It is self-evident that the two Governments are more than ever determined to remain true to these obligations.

As far as military matters are concerned, the agreement of 1920 contains, in addition to general arrangements relative to contact between the General Staffs, special measures in regard to a common occupation of the left bank of the Rhine.

The two Governments, who clearly understand what portions of this agreement are no longer of current importance, have recognized the value of retaining only the one clause which holds good today, namely the understanding existing between them-which they now desire to confirm-relative to the continuance of General Staff contacts both for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Locarno-Rhineland Treaty and also of studying the technical conditions connected with a possible application of the said undertakings.

It remains agreed that military contacts of this nature cannot involve, for either of the parties to the treaty, and political obligation nor any undertaking relative to the organization of national defense.

I have the honor to confirm to Your Excellency that the above carries the assent of the French Government.

I take this opportunity of again assuring Your Excellency of my high esteem.

(signed) LAROCHE

A certified true copy:

s/ Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at Law

H0790 - 0034

Exhibit Ri. No. 230

S 40

COPY

from White Book No 5.

Further documents concerning the Anglo - French policy of extending the wa, The General Staff conversations between Britain and France on the one hand and Belgium and Holland on the other hand.

(page 5 - 7)

Summary

Early in 1939, when the British policy of war against German was already being actively pursued, consultations were held in the Belgian Senate Committee for Foreign Affairs in which military contacts between Belgium and Britain and France were discussed in great detail. In the earl part of 1940 no effort was made to deny that these secret General Staff conversations were taking place. Thus, on February 7, the Belgian War Minister declared that "no factor had been left unaccounted for by responsible Belgian authorities to enable the Powers guaranteeing the independence of Belgium to fulfill the obligations which they have solemnly undertaken." These guarantor powers were Germany, Britain and France.

.....

However, since Germany had never been approached by Belgium in regard to General Staff agreements, the guarantor powers referred to by the Belgian War Minister consisted of Britain and France exclusively. The following day, February 8, 1940, brought a further confirmation of this Belgian policy, When Grammens, a Deputy of the Belgian Chamber, demanded that fortifications also be erected along the southern frontier of Belgium he was immediately interrupted by the War Minister and the Speaker on the grounds that"he should say nothing which might be prejudicial to the defense of the country or could be interpreted in a malevolent sense." Briefly, the Belgian General Staff, in its efforts to avoid exposing its one-side military policy against Germany, exercised great care to conceal from the world at large that Belgium had erected fortifications only along the German border.

H0790 - 0035

There is therefore no doubt that General Staff arrangements were made years ago between Belgium and France and Britain - and also with Holland.

Due to the rapid advance of the German troops, a vast quantity of fresh evidence has fallen into German hands. This evidence, consisting of orders, service instructions, maps, etc. , affords clear proof that not only were General Staff agreements reached between the High Command of France, Britain, Belgium and Holland, but, on the basis of these agreements, orders for all military units were drawn up and handed out to them for study.

The evidence proves beyond doubt that the whole advance of the Franco - Belgian Army was planned on the basis of intimate cooperation with the Belgian General Staff.

A certified true copy:

s/ Dr. Martin HORN

H0790 – 0036

Ri.Exhibit No.230a

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Copy

from White-Book No. 6

of the "Documents on the Sole Guilt of England for the Bombing War against the Civilian Population."

No. 60

Summary of the Meeting of the Supreme Council in London.

17.November 1939.

(Extract)

At the meeting were present:

for France :

Daladier,
Corbin,
General Gamelin,
Admiral Darlan,
General Vuillemin,
General Koeltz,
Admiral Odend'hal,
General Lelong,
de Charbonniere;

for England :

Chamberlain,
Lord Halifax,
Lord Chatfiel,
Sir Kingsley Wood,
Sir Horace Wilson,
Sir Alexander Cadogan,
Sir Edward Bridges,
Air Marshal Sir Cyril Newall,
General Ismay,

F. Roberts.

Chamberlain hopes that he will soon be able to go to France. In the meantime, a question of great importance has come up which has taken on an especially urgent character in the light of the recent events. Differences of opinion have arisen over it on the part of the French and the British General Staffs and it appears necessary to call a special meeting of the Supreme Council for the purpose of solving the difficulties.

The Prime Minister will try to give a picture of the problem from his view point.

The matter in question is to ascertain the most effective use to be made of a part of the British air force under certain circumstances. .....

There are differences of opinion on the following point : What part shall the British long range bombers play ? It does not seem to be appropriate to use them for the same task as is assigned to the air force with smaller range. Both High Commands agree on the fact that these two types of air planes were built for different purposes and that each type shows distinct marks therefor.

The British Air Force General Staff has designed a plan for the destruction of the Ruhr basin to put to use their long range bombers..... How did the British Government come to think of bombing the Ruhr basin ?

Essentially because objectives of considerable importance are concentrated in a limited territory. One may estimate that the Ruhr basin holds 60 % of the German industry. It possesses "key industries" supplying raw materials for the entire German industry. There is no doubt about the fact that a complete destruction of this industrial territory would practically paralyze the entire German war industry and, one may say, the entire German life.

Besides, there is an extremely compact net of rail ways in the Ruhr basin. Five of the ten main rail lines go through this territory. It contains distribution stations and railway junctions vital especially for Germany. This is true for instance of Hamm. The Prime Minister points to the fact that all these points of greatest importance are concentrated in a territory of small dimensions.

HO790 – 0037

H0790-0038

Is it possible to destroy the Ruhr territory ? 544

The British Air Force has carried out a complete reconnaissance over the territory during the last weeks. It has taken for the greatest part from lox altitudes, innumerable photographs. It now possesses a complete map of the territory with the smallest details. The smallest factory, the smallest electric power station, the smallest blast furnace, the smallest channel, are marked in the spot where they are actually located. But that is not all. The technical departments made a plaster relief model of the entire area as it appears from the air. This model has been made and painted in such a way that it gives exactly the same impression which the area makes the pilots flying over it.

A corps of exceptionally courageous pilots has been trained especially for the bombing of this area. Everybody knows already which target he will have to hit and how he will be able to recognize it.

According to the plan the heavy bombers would fly low over Belgium and then fly over the Ruhr basin at top speed almost touching the chimneys. They would be divided into small groups and every plane of each group would move towards and try to reach the target assigned to it. To fly at this low altitude would serve the purpose of avoiding the fire from the heavy and medium anti-aircraft batteries and fighter planes which cannot work effectively at such a low altitude. The only suitable defense weapons would be machine guns or light anti-aircraft guns.

The plan does not provide for the attack to be carried out in one blow and in one single day. On the contrary, it would have to be continued week after week during a long period, perhaps for two or three months. During that time steady penetration flights would be undertaken by sending out consecutive waves of planes.

H0790 — 0039

Every effort would be made daily to complete the destruction carried out previously. The penetration flights would take place both at night and during the day. The population would have no peace at any time. In the steady succession of alarms they would have no chance to sleep or work. It would be impossible for them to start repairing the damages.

In other words, the matter in question is not an improvisation, but a plan set up with greatest care the details of which were all tested especially. In the opinion of the British military experts the proposed undertaking would bring about far greater damage than any other plan. The British High Command, naturally, examined other possibilities such as the systematic bombing of the gasoline dumps, air fields etc. However, it came to the conclusion that by far the most effective undertaking would be the bombing of the Ruhr basin.

..... Chamberlain insists on a resolution without the least loss of time if the undertaking is to be effective. No minute must be lost on discussions.

The Prime Minister points out that he presented the plan in details and that his listeners might have the impression that he was personally enthusiastic about it. In reality he is convinced that it is a very skillfully prepared plan, the success of which seems possibly to him. But at the same time he shudders at the thought of having to give the necessary order and hopes that there will never be the necessity to do so.

However well trained and skillful the English flyers, however good and fast their planes may be, the fact could not be overlooked that the losses would be very heavy. Of course, they could not be computed in advance, but in the opinion of the experts they would amount to about one fifth to half of the assigned

planes and crews. For the Prime Minister this is a prospect to be taken into consideration all the less lightly as the sacrificed crews in question would be the best of the British air force, the true "cream" of the Royal Air Force which it would probably be very difficult to replace.

If after the first days it should appear that the operation does not meet with success,that the established targets cannot be reached and that the losses are heavier than anticipated, it would certainly not be possible to continue the operation. However, one of the reasons for which Chamberlain would only unwillingly order the operation is that in this way attacks on open cities would have begun. Of course, it is here essentially a matter of destroying military targets; but these are located in such a way that it is impossible to hit them without involving civilians. Thus, one thing would lead to another until it would be almost impossible to wage war without any limitations. If all other considerations, such as the moral ones, are put aside, it is certain that France and Great Britain are not protected against air attacks as well as they might wish to be. The factories and industrial centers of the Allies are vulnerable and there exists no doubt about the fact that the Germans would immediately take reprisals. The Prime Minister would like to avoid them. The effect of the bombings on the production of air planes and munition,carried out by Germany as reprisals,would certainly be considerable. If the Germans themselves began to attack certain British industrial centers by air, it would not be necessary to hesitate in the least to answer with the same means : however, it is a different matter to initiate such war fare oneself.

Obviously, it would be impossible to avoid the loss of human life among the civilian population, however low the planes would fly and however accurately they would drop their bombs. This would be exploited to the utmost by the German propaganda, although the Germans had themselves perpetrated worse things.

H0790-0040

Nevertheless, the Prime Minister remains disturbed at the thought of what effect on the neutral countries and, particularly, on the United States the German propaganda may have which would point to the Allies as the first ones to have started bombing the civilian population. Therefore, Chamberlain is certainly not ready to embark on an undertaking which, aside from its effects in the purely military field, would also have important consequences in political respects. .....

..... Under these conditions he wishes to submit to the French representatives the following question: Are you ready to tell us that you will leave it to our discretion to issue the order for bombing the Ruhr basin in case we think the situation to be serious enough to justify such a decision ? .....

..... D a l a d i e r agrees on the extraordinary importance of the industrial territory of the Ruhr. If Germany could be robbed of it, it would constitute an extremely serious blow. She (Germany) would, perhaps, actually have to desist from continuing the war and seek to come to terms. Perhaps, it would also lead to a people's movement threatening the Hitler Government. Viewed from the military, economic and political standpoint, the destruction of the Ruhr basin would constitute a major event in waging the war.

However, the Prime Minister has grave misgivings.

Although he realizes its entire importance, he does not wish to take the moral aspect into consideration. Undoubtedly, it is impossible to bomb factories without hitting male workers or even female workers, in other words civilians, old people, women and children. Daladier is absolutely aware of the use the German propaganda would not fail to make of such an event .....

..... He will judge exclusively from the military point of view.

HO790 - 0041

H0790 - 0042

He is certain that the plan as explained to him was worked out very carefully and that it represents a very earnest design. At this occasion he wishes to praise the courage and ability of the British fliers, w ho were able to take photographs of the entire Ruhr basin. ; and thus provide the details which made possible the construction of the model just mentioned by Chamberlain. This is a good performance, which honors the British airplanes and their crews.

Daladier listened very attentively to the detailed and complete report of th Prime Minister. It is absolutely clear to him that the British fliers upon receiving orders for the bombing of the Ruhr Basin. ., will start at once an approach the targets designated in their orders flying so low that they will almost be at chimney level etc.

. . . . . He has not the slightest doubt in that respect. He would like, however, to ask two pregnant questions: How many long range bombers does the British airforce possess at the moment? How many does Germany possess on her part? For the Minister President is afraid that the English fliers despite all their courage and all their qualities are not numerous enough to carry through a rather complete destruction of the Ruhr basin. . He does not agre that it would be possible to stop and let the matter rest should the results not be sufficient and losses too high. . . . . .

. . . . . Daladier believes – in fact, he is even certain – that the Ruhr i basin. is extremely well protected by Anti-Aircraft Artillery. It is not only provided with a large amount of artillery of medium and heavy calibre (88 mm guns and bigger), but also with special protection from machine guns and short range cannons. In this regard the Germans are doubtlessly far more advanced than the Allies. Each individual plant isprotected by light calibre artillery and this protection again is part of a defense system of heavy artillery for the entire territorry. The Minister President is convinced that the intended air attack would result in the loss of at least half of the British airplanes.

H0790 - 0043

What a triumph for Germany and what an increase of authority for the Hitler government in Germany herself, if the English High Command would be forced by such losses to give up the continuation of the undertaking. Should the Allies be forced to give up their attacks, the Germans, on the other hand, would not consider that a reason for abandoning their reprisals against France and Great Britain. This counter assault would result in paralyzing the simultaneous rearmament efforts of both countries in the field of the air and ground forces. As far as France is concerned she is trying hard to increase substantially the number of her bombers. Before and since the start of the war she has ordered a great number of machines in the United States. During the same time she developed her own production and is presently building modern, fast airplanes, which are satisfactory in every respect, but not numerous enough at the present moment. The French plan, therefore, consists of gaining as much time as possible for the construction of bombers, this being at the moment the weak point in the French military organization. Daladier explains that the French airplane industry is not yet entirely decentralized. The transfer of plants is in progress, but has not been carried out entirely. Especially the plant Gnome & Rhone, one of the most important for the production of engines, is still located in the Paris district. The bombing of these plants, situated in particularly vulnerable districts, would cause a delay of several months, may-be even of several years in the air rearmament of France. The same goes for all fields of the war industry. Daladier thinks it a bad policy to take such a risk without being certain of success. Would one be certain of achieving the destruction of the Ruhr basin , one could - maybe - accept the destruction of numerous plants in France and Great Britain. This, however, is not the case. In reality there is at the moment too great a disparity between the German and the Allied bombers. The possible risk lies in the possibility that the latter do not succeed in destroying the Ruhr district, - but that the Germans, on the other hand, succeed in destroying plants in France and Great Britain.

H0790 - 0044

The Prime Minister would therefore by far prefer to leave to the Germans the initiative and responsibility for having been the first to start the bombardement of industrial areas, so that they would be the first in attacking towns and factories and in hitting women and children. The slightes opposition to the plan of the British Government would be difficult and unfair if they take such initiative. The French Government not only would be in complete agreement, but would also try, according to the means, of the French air forces, to collaborate with the English ones - Daladier however repeats that for the moment this initiative would have to be left to the Germans and that it would be dangerous and disadvantageous to the cause of the Allies to carry out a bombardement of the Ruhr region. . . . . .

. . . . . In a few months the situation will be different without doubt. According to the Prime Minister's informations on hand the British air forces will have attained until then a considerable development by that time. France in her turn will have received the equipment ordered in the United States and her own production will reach its improvement. The French aviation industry, for instance, has finished the models Liore and Potez, whic are outstanding but not produced yet. If the factories will not be destroyed, interesting results should be noticed in a few weeks and in any case a considerable number of machines will be put into service in the next few moths. Daladier agrees that at the very moment the Allies prove not to be inferior to the Germans anymore, the undertaking described by Chamberlain should be taken into consideration. The Prime Minister is thus far away from proposing the abandonment of the plan. He, on the contrary, proposes, that one should retain it and endeavour to improve it. But in an immediate execusion of the plan Daladier sees more disadvantages than advantages . . . . . .

H0790 - 0045

..... The Prime Minister expresses his thanks to the Minister President for this statement in which he presents his standpoint with the clearness and force peculiar to him. The arguments presented by him are undeniably very strong. t any rate, whatever differences of opinion may arise between the French and English, they will not quarrel over this matter. Besides, there is not the slightest reason for a quarrel. Chamberlain does not demand that a decision be reached already at present. .....,

....., Daladier declares that it would actually be wiser to postpone the question of bombing the Ruhr area. In order to avoid any misunderstanding he repeats that, in his opinion, it need not to be prepared. He fully understands its importance. He did not at all intend to condemn it, but just thinks it should be kept in reserve .....

Copy certified by:

signed: Dr. Martin Horn

Dr. Martin Horn

attorney at law.

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H0790 - 0046

Exhibit Ri. No. 231

COPY

552

from the White Book No. 5

Further documents concerning the policy of the Western powers of extending the war.

Footnote

Ministry of National Defense
Territorial Civil Guard

5. Div. S.S.P.A.P.
No. 1889/57.7.37.C.M.
Attached: 1 map
E.M.

Confidential

Evacuation of the Civilian Population

Art. I. Women, children, invalids and the aged will be conducted by the Territorial Civil Guard in conjunction with local Red Cross formations.

Art. II. In deciding upon the route to be taken, the instructions issued by Army General H.Q. as information is received will be strictly observed.

Art. III. None of the main roads or approach roads marked on the accompanying plans are to be used for the purpose of evacuation.

(Art. IV. to XV contain technical details in regard to carrying out the evacuation.)

Certified correct copy
Transmitted by order

(signed) Lt. - General Termonia.

(The ministerial decree includes the following supplementary instruction

Our extract from the map:

The following are reserved for the British Army:

Furnes to Ostend,

Furnes to Bruges via Ghistelles,

A certified true copy:

s/ Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at Law

C o p y

from the W h i t e - B o o k N o 5

Page 7

Further Documents Concerning the Policy of the Western Powers of Extention the War.

.....

Further proof of this is furnished by a 1937 decree of the Belgian War Ministry relating to the evacuation of civilians, which lately fell in German hands. This decree was a comprehensive plan for evacuating women, children, old people and invalids, etc., from those areas regarded as the scene of future military operations. Characteristic of the plans for a concentration of the Belgo-Franco-British Armies is a note in this decree stating that certain roads and approach-roads should not be employed for the evacuation because they were "reserved for the British Army."

.....

Copy certified by:

Dr. Martin Horn

Attorney-at-Law

H0790 - 0047

H0790 – 0048

Exhibit Ri. No 232

554

COPY

from the White Book No 5.

Further documents concerning the policy of the Western powers of extending the war.

I. Orders issued by the Commander of the French Detachment operating in Luxemburg , May 2, 1940.

Secret

204th Inf. Rgt.
The Commander of the
Detachment Operating in
Luxemburg
No. 3284/C

SERVICE INSTRUCTIONS

CHANGE IN THE ORDER FOR WITHDRAWAL

The 2nd Battalion of the 204th Inf. Rgt. will occupy the farm of AIRSAIN on receipt of the order:

"Enter Luxemburg , move immediately."

A certified true copy:

s/ Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at Law

H0790-0049

Exhibit Ri. No. 233

555

COPY

from the White Book No. 5

Further documents concerning the policy of the Western powers of extending the war.

The General Staff conversations between Britain and France on the one hand and Belgium and Holland on the other hand.

2. REGIMENTAL ORDERS REGARDING OBJECTIVES IN BELGIUM ISSUED BY THE 4TH FRENCH CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE CAR REGIMENT, APRIL 2, 1940

H.Q. April 2, 1940

4th Light Division
14th Light Brigade
4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Car Regiment

.....

Intentions of the Lt.-Col. Commanding the 4th Cavalry Reconnaicance Car. R

1. To proceed as rapidly as possible to the Meuse, to occupy and hold its crossings and to take special defensive measures on the BIOUL - GODINNE - YVOIR line.
2. To reconnoiter as quickly as possible beyond the above - mentioned line, with principal points of attack in the southern part.
3. To establish advanced protection along the line decided upon, such protection first of all offering resistance in the southern part of the section (CRUPET - DORINNE).
4. To repulse small enemy detachments which might have crossed the Meuse, and in any case to assure possession of the LESVES - BIOUL line of observation posts, to keep possession of the fringe of the woods to the west of the river.

A certified true copy:

s/Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at Law

H0790 - 0050

Exhibit Ri. No 234

556

COPY

from the White Book No 5.

Further documents concerning the policy of the Western powers of extending the war.

The General Staff conversations between Britain and France on the one hand and Belgium and Holland on the other hand.

3. MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING FUEL SUPPLIES IN BELGIUM FOR THE 4TH FRENCH LIGHT DIVISION

.....

Organization of fuel supply:

During the day of Jl: supply from civilian Belgian filling stations against special vouchers is regulated by the group leaders and by the independent detachment commanders.

A certified true copy:

s/ Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at Law

H0790-0051

Exhibit Ri. No. 235

557

COPY

from the White Book No. 5

Further documents concerning the policy of the Western powers of extending the war.

The General Staff conversations between Britain and France on the one hand and Belgium and Holland on the other hand.

4. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF FRENCH TROOPS TO BELGIUM BY RAIL

General H.Q. April 16, 1940.

High Command of the Army,
General Headquarters.
General Staff.
4th Bureau.
2nd Division.
No. 7.813 - 4/F.T.

Instructions
for transportation by rail
according to Plan "Y"

A railway transport plan, in the event of operations on Belgian territory, has been set up at the request of the armies, for the units allotted to them which will move automatically according to the events of day J 1,

.....

A certified true copy:

s/ Dr. Martin HORN

H0790-0052

Exhibit Ri. No. 236

558+559

COPY

from the White Book No. 5

Further documents concerning the policy of the Western powers of extend-ding the war.

The General Staff conversations between Britain and France on the one hand and Belgium and Holland on the other hand.

5. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE STUDY OF MARCH ROUTES INTO BELGIUM

INSTRUCTION NO. IV

ROUTES

I. MARCH ROUTES (2 sketches attached)

Should the Light motorized Division halt on the CHARLEROI Canal or on the contrary proceed without break to the transverse line WAVRE - GEMBLOUX, the routes allotted to the various groups on the move remain the same as far as the Belgian frontier.

Across the Belgian frontier the plan of march will change according to the situation offered.

II. STARTING POINT AND TIME OF CROSSING THE FRONTIER

The units forming part of the various groups will commence their march from the starting point at the time stated below.....

III. RECONNAISSANCE AND STUDY OF ROUTES

The reconnaissance of routes, I 1- I 2- I 3 as far as the frontier, must have been previously carried out by all Captains and Section Leaders. N.C.O.s for direction finding, workshop staff, baggage-train gruup leaders, etc., in short, all the officers responsible for the direction of the smallest formations or by N.C.O.s who have to proceed alone (workshop, staff, direction-finders, detail).

The study of march routes beyond the frontier will have to be made by map. The sketches of routes hereby attached, which have been distributed down to sections of squadrons, are to be reproduced in th form of tracings by the subordinate units mentioned in the above para-graph. This work must be completed by February 8th.

A certified true copy:

s/ Dr. Martin HORN

H0790-0053

Exhibit Ri. No. 237

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COPY

from the White Book NO. 5

Further documents concerning the policy of the Western powers of extending the war.

The General Staff conversations between Britain and France on the one hand and Belgium and Holland on the other hand.

6. EXTRACT FROM THE DIARY OF FRENCH LIEUTENANT DOLLFUSS OF 16 JANUARY 1940 CONCERNING THE CARRYING OUT OF A RECONNAICANCE IN BELGIUM.

.....

16th January - Reconnaicance of the positions in Belgium.

.....

A certified true copy:

s/ Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at Law

H0790-0054

Exhibit Ri. No. 238

COPY

561

from the White Book No. 5.

Further documents concerning the policy of the Western powers of extending the war.

The General Staff conversations between Britain and France on the one hand and Belgium and Holland on the other hand.

8. STATEMENT OF A FRENCH PRISONER OF WAR ON THE PRESENCE OF FRENCH TROOPS IN BELGIUM BEFORE MAY 10, 1940.

Report of Wireless Operator Walter Dick.

O.U. May 16, 1940.

Re Statement of a French prisoner of war.

On May 12, 1940, I traveled with a motorcycle dispatch rider from Bertric to Bastogne. At Recogne a destroyed railway bridge stopped us. Five French prisoners of war belonging to a tank unit were standing at the bridge. One of these prisoners addressed me in German and told me that for a whole day they had been encamped in a house to the left of the bridge and that no one had worried about them, In the course of the conversation and in reply to my question, how long they had been in Belgium, he answered: "Since the 15th of last month." Two infantry and anti-aircraft Lieutenants were witnesses to this conversation from time to time. I cannot say definitely that both officers took full notice of the remarks of this French prisoner of war. Besides August Picker, the motorcycle dispatch rider, one other German soldier was present, who expressed his astonishment at the statement made.

I am prepared to confirm the above statement on oath.

(signed) Walter DICK,
Wireless Operator.

August Picker, the motorcycle dispatch rider, Unit 18330, declared:

I have heard the statement made by the French prisoner of war and am also prepared to confirm same on oath.

(signed) August PICKER
Senior Wireless Operator.

A certified true copy:

s/ Dr. Martin HORN

Attotney at Law

H07790-0055

Exhibit Ai. No. 239

562+563

COPY

from the White Book No. 5.

Further documents concerning the policy of the Western powers of extending the war.

The General Staff conversations between Britain and France on the one hand and Belgium and Holland on the other hand.

9. MEMORANDUM BY THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE 9TH FRENCH ARMY ON THE INTENDED MOVEMENT OF BELGIAN TROOPS EAST OF THE MEUSE, MARCH 28, 1940

Secret

CE/BA
9th Army.
General Staff
2 Office

No. 1748/2

This draft must not leave the Offices of the General Staff of the 9th Army.

Headquarters, March 28, 1940

Memorandum Covering the Intended Belgian Movements East of the Meuse

---

The intended Belgian movements east of the Meuse (Note No. 634/2 S. of March 19) give rise to the following remarks:

.....

II. - Supporting units on the river Meuse

1. Fortified position at LIEGE

.....

5. Fortified position of NAMUR
This position appears to be better defended than that of LIEGE:

.....

DEDUCTION

If we disregard the undefended sections up-stream from NAMUR, it would appear that the weak point of the Belgian MEUSE defenses is the sector lyin between the HUY and the fortified position of LIEGE, because the troops charged with the defense of this sector would be exhausted, and would go in action at the last moment.

It furthermore appears that no reserves of any serious account seem to have been provided in the rear of the rallying position of LIEGE-NAMUR.

A certified true copy:

s/ Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at Law

H0790-0056

Exhibit Ri. No. 240

564

COPY

from the White Book No. 5.

Further documents concerning the policy of the Western powers of extending the war.

The General Staff conversations between Britain and France on the one hand and Belgium and Holland on the other hand.

10. ORDERS CONCERNING INFORMATION ABOUT FRIENDLY TROOPS AND ERECTION OF A FORTIFIED POSITION, ISSUED BY THE 2ND BELGIAN GRENADIER REGIMENT,

APRIL 13, 1940

2nd Grenadier Regiment

Regimental Staff

In the Field, April,13, 1940.

Secret
No. 243/567

ORDER FOR CONSOLIDATING AND DEFENDING THE POSITION HAL-CASTRE-PAMEL

I. Information concerning friendly troops -

Friendly forces will occupy a general front in the direction of TOURNAI-ANTOING-CANAL FROM MONS TO CONDE-SE. GHISLAIN-BINCHE.

.....

A certified true copy:

s/ Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at Law

HO 790-0057

Exhibit Ri. No. 241

COPY

565

from the White Book No. 5.

Further documents concerning the policy of the Western powers of extending the war.

The General Staff conversations between Britain and France on the one hand and Belgium and Holland on the other hand.

11. ORDER CONCERNING PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES IN BELGIUM ISSUED BY THE 2ND BRITISH DIVISION, APRIL, 19, 1940

Secret

2Div 202/1/G/1
19 April 40.

4 Inf Bde (1)
5 Inf Bde (1)
6 Inf Bde (1)
4/7 D.G. (1)
R.A. (1)
R.E. (1)
R.A.S.C. (1)
Pro (1)
F.S.P. (1)
F.L.O. (1) A/Q (letter only).

1. Contact with Belgian civil authorities.

a) The first contact in any Belgian village should be with the Burgomaster, the second with the local Brigade de Gendarmerie the headquarters of which will be found in the chef-lieu of the canton.

The Gendarmerie, as in France, are in possession of information on all inhabitants of the canton concerned.

Their duties and organization correspond with those of the French Gendarmerie; they are responsible for all matters regarding of recruitment of personnel into the Army, and for all questions of mobilization affecting the civil population. In co-operation with the civil police, represented in country districts by the Gardes Champetres, under the Burgomaster, they are also responsible for the maintenance of law and order.

.....

H0790-0058

Exhibit Mi. No. 241
(cont.)

560

4. Suspect cars and persons.

(a) A list of suspect cars giving the owner's name and the number of the car is given in Appx A.

(b) A list of persons whom the authorities should be requested to place under arrest is given in Appx B.

A certified true copy:

s/Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at Law

H0790-0059

Exhibit Ri. No. 242

567

COPY

from the White Book No 5.

Further documents concerning the policy of the Western powers of extending the war.

The General Staff conversations between Britain and France on the one hand and Belgium and Holland on the other hand.

13. ORDERS CONCERNING LIAISON WITH BELGIAN AND BRITISH ARMY COMMANDS, ISSUED BY THE 1ST FRENCH MOTORIZED LIGHT DIVISION, DECEMBER 18, 1939

Secret

1st Motorized Light Division
General Staff 3 Office
No. 407 3 S.

Staff Headquarters, Dec. 18, 1939

Special Orders for General Operation Order No. 17 a

I. Liaison with Army Commands

1. Advance up to the Canal.

a) In the vanguard with Belgian troops

.....

b) On the flanks

.....

With the British Forces (2nd British Division or Hotblack 4/7th Dragoons).....

II. Tactical Liaison

Assure all echelons from right to left.

1. Advance up to the Canal.

a) Canal reconnaissance in conjunction with the British:.....

A certified true copy

s/Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at Law

H0790-0060

Exhibit Ri. No. 243

COPY

568

from the White Book No. 5.

Further documents concerning the policy of the Western powers of extending the war.

The General Staff conversations between Britain and France on the one hand and Belgium and Holland on the other hand.

17. ORDER COVERING THE ADVANCE ON THE DUTCH TOWN OF BRESKENS, ISSUED BY A SUB-COMMANDER OF THE SPECIAL FRENCH DETACHMENT, NOVEMBER 15, 1939

Sub-Group D'Astafort

Command Bray - Dunes, 15.11.3

.....

II. Intentions of Lieutenant-Colonel d'Astafort, Commander of the Western Group.

1. To throw out a strong vanguard when crossing the frontier, the task of which would be to reach BRESKENS with all possible speed and immediately to embark and cross the moth of the SCHELDT under the protection of the air force and thus be in a position to occupy the aerodrome of FLUSHING.

2. To have the divisional reconnaissance detachment follow up in a sufficiently deep formation and to have it embark as soon as the vanguard has achieved a successful crossing.

3. To occupy the aerodrome of FLUSHING as soon as the first detachments have disembarked. To send out reconnaissance detachments toward DOMBURG, WESTKAPELLE in the same measure as further troops arrive after their disembarkation and to take up liaison at MIDDELBOURG with the detachment from ARNEMUIDEN.

4. To ensure the protection of the south bank at BRESKENS.

.....

A certified true copy:

s/ Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at Law

H0790-0061

Exhibit Ai. No. 244

COPY

569

from the White Book No. 5.

Further documents concerning the policy of the Western powers of extending the war.

The General Staff conversations between Britain and France on the one hand and Belgium and Holland on the other hand.

18. ORDER CONCERNING THE ADVANCE ON THE DUTCH TOWN OR BREDA, ISSUED BY THE COMMANDER OF A FRENCH RECONNAISSANCE DETACHMENT, APRIL17, 1940.

Reconnaissance Detachment of 2nd Inf. Div.
Detachment for Long-Distance Reconnaissance.
No. 2/O
Secret

Commanding Officer, April, 17, 1940.

Advance Order No 2.

.....

III. Tasks for Reconnaissance Detachment:

A Reconnaissance Detachment of the 6th Cuirassiers as vanguard.

1. To advance in the general direction of BRUGES - ANTWERP - BREDA, as far as the crossroads:

I. BRUGES * OOSTKAMP

II. ANTWERP - MALINES.

A certified true copy:

s/ Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at Law

H0790-0062

Exhibit Mi. No. 245

570

COPY

from the White Book No 5.

Further documents concerning the policy of the Western powers of extending the war.

The General Staff conversations between Britain and France on the one hand and Belgium and Holland on the other hand.

19. MEMORANDUM CONCERNING COOPERATIVE ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY THE DUTCH, BELGIAN, BRITISH AND FRENCH ARMIES, SENT BY THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE DUTCH LAND AND SEA FORCES

.....

page 49, par. 3

The Command of the Dutch Army is seriously considering offering acti opposition in the Peel Raam area lying in North Brabant (from Weert to Nieuwerweert - Meyel - Helenaveen - Griendtsveen and Mill to Grave) by the troops stationed there, and has had considerable fortifications constructed in order to equip this position for such resistance.

.....

.....

page 50, par. 3

The extent to which the Dutch Army can hold its own on the above-mentioned lines and in Zeeland will depend amongst other things on the strength of the invading German troops and on the help afforded it by the French and the British.

.....

page 50, par. 5

I request Your Excellency to inform the Belgian Government forthwith that the above-mentioned lines as well as the positions in Zeeland are so organized and manned that if the French and British troops coming to their assistance can rapidly reach their positions, they would be able to offer the most desperate resistance. If this help is delayed, then, considering the length of the above-mentioned lines and the necessity of relieving the troops in consequence of the long duration of the war, the possibility will have to be envisaged of the Dutch troops being withdrawn into Vesting Holland. The Commander in Chief of the Dutch Army has expressly informed the French and British Governments that he would deeply regret such a measure from the standpoint of Holland itself, as well as from an international point of view. He draws their attention to the fact that the

H0790-0063

Exhibit Ri. No. 245
(cont.)

defense of the Grebbe Line leaves open the possibility of advancing from this line at any given moment in order to proceed to an attack, whereas the encirclement of troops on the Grebbe Line would require more hostile forces than the encirclement of Vesting Holland.

The Hague, March 23, 1940.

The General Commander in Chief of Land and Sea Forces

H.G. WINKELMAN.

A certified true copy:

s/ Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at Law

March 22, 1946

We, CATHERINE BEDFORD, Brit. Civ., 110561; and JOHN B. ROBINSON, Civ., X-046350, hereby certify that we are thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the original Document.

CATHERINE BEDFORD
Brit. Civ., 110661

JOHN B. ROBINSON
Civ., X-046350

Exhibit Ri. No.246

H0790-0064

B 37

572+573

COPY

from the White Book No.6
(Foreign Office 1939/41)

The Secret Documents of the French General Staff

No.5

Handwritten letter from General Weygand, Commander-in-Chief of the French Troops in the Levant, to General Gamelin, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army.
(Translation of Facsimile on page 178)

Beirut, 9 September 1939.

My dear Gamelin,

. . . . . .

Par.4. We are completing the final establishment of the Expeditionary Corps.

. . . . . .

Par.5.

You are aware of the causes of the delay in my visit to Ankara. A telegram from Massigli today leads me to expect a prompt solution of the difficulties which have not yet been overcome. He also tells me that the Greek General Staff are not quite ready for my visit but that they would send an officer with whom I could have a secret conversation. All these delays and precautions, though I can understand them, are very disagreeable to me because they complicate the question of Salonika. I believe that if the present political situation in regard to Italy does not permit an immediate installation of Allied troops at Salonika, Greece can at least be asked to allow extensive preparations to be made in view of this occupation -- particularly the sending of experts to find bases and means of supply, and perhaps even the carrying out of some road-building or defence work by the Greeks themselves. I shall try to obtain this at my first meeting with the Greeks at Ankara.

In regard to the preparations for transportation of the Expeditionary Corps, I am very much afraid that the Turkish railways are not able to handle much traffic and that through rail transport will prove impossible. It will be necessary to make use of sea transport, which would be less exposed and at the same time faster in the end if embarkation took place at Beirut and not at Smyrna. . . . . , Weygand.

****

Certified True Copy. Dr. M. Horn.

Exhibit Ri. No.247

COPY

514

from the White Book No. 6.(Foreign Office 1939/41)
Secret Documents of the French General Staff

No.2.

The French Premier and Minister for National Defence and War to General Weygand, Commander-in-Chief of the French Troops in the Levant.

(Translation of Facsimile on page 168)

Very Secret

Re:
Expeditionary Corps
No. 8.636 1/E.M.A.

Paris, 19 July 1939.

Reference: Letter 1382/3 of 4 July 1939)

I. Further to my cable 3.106 3/E.M.A.-P. of 17 July 1939, I have the honour of informing you of the composition of the Expeditionary Corps which I propose to form in the Levant.

. . . . . .

By Order.

COISON.

. . . . . .

Certified True Copy.

Dr. M. Horn.

H0790-0065

H0790-0066

Exhibit Ri. No.248

COPY

575

from the White Book No.6 (Foreign Office 1939/41)

The Secret Documents of the French General Staff

No.6.

General Gamelin, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, to General Weygand, Commander-in-Chief of the French Troops in the Levant.

Telegram

(Translation of Facsimile on page 182)

S e c r e t
No.10

General Headquarters, 10 September 1939
10.25 p.m.

In reply to 597:

(1) Suggestion approved that designation "Expeditionary Corps" be reserved for the totality of the large units to be sent abroad.

(2) For political reasons designation "Division" is to be given to every mixed brigade raised in the Levant, which should also be well supplied with cavalry.

****

Certified True Copy.

Dr. Martin Horn.

H0790-0067

Ri. Exhibit No. 249

COPY

576

from White-Paper No. 7

No. 111

Note by the Assistant Director of the Europe Dvision of the French Foreign Ministry.

(Excerpt)

20 September 1939

Diplomatic situation in the Balkans.

.....

GREECE

The Greek government is carrying out a policy of neutrality, which is officially extremely strict, but secretly is directed towards a possible French - English cooperation. A Greek General Staff Officer has been sent to Ankara in order to get into touch with General WEYGAND and to take part in the elaboration of certain plans for a joint action. Italian feelers for the purpose of renewing the Italian - Greek non-aggression pact were received by General METAXAS, with the utmost reserve. .....

Certified true copy:

Dr. HORN
Attorney at Law

H0790-0068

Ri-Exhibit No. 250

COPY

511

from the White-Paper No. 7

No. 110

Note for the French Ministerial Council

(Excerpt)

20 September 1939

.....

GREECE

Remains faithful to the Western Powers. The Italian Government has requested that a treaty of friendship, which expires next October, be renewed. It would however prefer to sign only a treaty of neutrality. Moreover, it will only sign such a one if as long as an agreement of that kind does not interfere with the formation of an Eastern front (explanation by Mr. POLITIS to Mr. OCULONDRE on 18 September) .....

Certified true copy:

Dr. HORN
Attorney at Law

H0790-0069

Ri. Exhibit No. 251

C o p y

578

from the White Book No.7

No.112

The French Naval Attache in Athens to the Commander-in-Chief of the French Naval Forces

Report

No. 22

Athens 5 October 1939

Secret and personal

Re: Opinion of the Greek government regarding a possible landing of allied troops in Saloniki.

In my letter No.11 of 22 September I pointed out that in spi of the kind feelings of the Greek government toward us, the pres state of the diplomatic and military situation does not permit one to count on her consent to an open preparation for an expe- dition to Saloniki.

This opinion is confirmed by the conversation on this matter which Mr. Mavroudis, the Under-Secretary of State in the Ministr for Foreign Affairs, held with our ambassador in Athens by sheer coincidence.

In the course of this neither formal nor official conversati Mr. Mavroudis told Mr. Maugras that if we wanted to land an ar in Saloniki at a given time, Greece would not only offer no resistance, but she would even go so far as to have her own fight forces join ours "provided the success of the operation would be assured through diplomatic and military preparation."

2 "Part of this presupposition", Mr. Mavroudis stressed, "wil be the participation of Yugoslavia, whose army would have to for the vanguard of the expedition."

In a telegram of 25 September to his own government, Mr. Ma gras reported Mr. Mavroudis' remarks; although they represented personal viewpoint and were expressed in the course of private conversation, one can nevertheless foresee from them what attitu the Greek government would take, if it were to be questioned through official channels.

Pol Lahalle

The correctness of this copy is certified by:
(signed) (Illegible)
Dr. Martin Horn
Attorney-at-law.

I, WANDA S.TIESZEN, X 046 265, hereby certify that I am thoroughl conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation.

WANDA S. TIESZEN
X 046 265

RIBBENTROP Exhibit No. 252

COPY

from White Paper No. 7

No. 118

The French Military Attache at Athens to the French Prime Minister, Minister for National Defense and Minister of War.

Report

(Excerpt)

Secret

Athens, 30 October 1939

No. 122/S

Concerning, Conversation with General PAPAGOS.

.....

Par. 2 The Chief of the General Staff of the Greek Army has assured me that the exchange of letters announced by me in my report Number 121/S of 29 October is very soon to take place, but that this was of no importance and that Greece had refused to renew the non-aggression pact, in order, if it should necessary, to preserve her freedom of action on the side of the Allies.....

Par. 3 I have taken this opportunity to speak to General PAPAGOS about the secret war potts in the vicinity of Kawalla. .....

Certified true copy:
t/ Dr. HORN
s/ Dr. HORN
Attorney at Law

H0790-0070

H0790-0071

RIBBENTROP Exhibit No 253

5 x C

COPY

from White Paper No 7.

No 123

The French Military Attache at ATHENS to the FRENCH MINISTRY of WAR

Telegram

No 232

Secret

ATHENS, 4 December 1939

Par. 1 . .... The Chief of the GREEK General Staff has expressed to the BRITISH Military Attache and to me the wish to hold discussions concerning the military questions, arising from the guarantees accorded to GREECE.

Par. 3 .....The French Ambassador at ATHENS has had a discussion on the same subject with the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

A certified true copy:

s/ Dr. Martin HOHN
Attorney at Law

H0790-0072

RIBBENTROP Exhibit No. 254

581

COPY

from White Paper No. 7.

No 128

Notes by the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, General GAMELIN, concerning a possible interallied intervention in the BALKANS.

(Excerpt)

189 Cab/D.N. Chief Headquarters, 4 January 1940

Par. 1 ..... The Chief of the General Staff of the GREEK Army has made it known that, provided there is adequate support by air and anti-aircraft forces, he would be able to guarantee the landing of an interallied expeditionary force at SALONIKI.

Par. 2 ..... The French High Command, while observing the greatest discretion, will continue to keep in touch with the YUGOSLAV , RUMANIAN and GREEK High Commands, without involving the chiefs of the BRITISH General Staff in any way.

s/ GAMELIN

A certified true copy:

s/ Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at Law

RIBBENTROP Exhibit No. 255

COPY

582 1583

from White Paper No. 7

No. 131

Notes by General GAMELIN, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, concerning the Franco-British Military policy in the Balkans and the Middle East.

(Excerpt)

Secret 6 March 1940

... 3. The Balkan problem concerns France above all, because France considers it desirable and possible:

a) To block the access for Germany and the Soviet Union to the straits and the Aegean Sea by way of the Balkans,

b) In the interior of the Balkans, for the Armies of the Baltic countries to oppose the German and Soviet-Russian Armies on an enormous attrition front.

This question, moreover, is closely connected with Italy's attitude, without whose open or silent consent we cannot move any fighting forces into Salonika.

In addition to this the French Army has always maintained regular relations with the Yugoslav, Rumanian and Greek Army. .....

Under these circumstances, the French High Command expects to place the main body of the French fighting forces in the Salonika territory, whether it be for the Allies a matter of blocking the access to the Aegean Sea to their enemies, or whether it is a matter of giving support to Yugoslavia or Rumania or first settling the Bulgarian problem with the consent of the other Balkan States.

s/ GAMELIN

A certified true copy:

Dr. HORN
Attorney at Law

H0790-0073

H0790-0074

Ri. Exhibit No. 256

584+585

COPY

from White Paper No. 7

No. 132

General WEYGAND, Commander-in-Chief of the EASTERN - MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE OF WAR, to General GAMELIN, Commander-in-Chief of the FRENCH ARMY

(Excerpt)

No. 333/3.S.

Secret

Headquarters, 14 March 1940

Concerning - Contacting the General Staffs in the BALKANS.

I have the honor to report to you how far we have succeeded in contacting the various General Staffs of the BALKANS and what results were achieved:

.....

In GREECE, Major CHERRIERE, an officer of the Administration of Transport and Railways, has just completed a reconnaissance of the bases which lasted about one week. The report concerning this is not yet in my possession.

The GREEK General Staff also permitted a tour of inspection by two Air Force officers. These officers have just returned. Their report is satisfactory. Their investigations have made it possible to ascertain the great trouble taken by the GREEK General Staff to create a ground organization which makes swift attack by modern air force groups possible. The GREEK General Staff places the following bases at our disposal from now on.

In THESSALY .....

In MACEDONIA.....

..... Our air force officers were very satisfied with their reception and the help accorded to them by the GREEK General Staff .....

General WEYGAND,
Commander-in-Chief of the EASTERN-
MEDITERENNAN THEATRE OF WAR-

Certifed true copy:

s/ Dr. HORN
Attorney at Law

RIBBENTROP Exhibit No. 257

COPY

516

from White Paper No. 7

No. 117

Report by the French Naval Attaché at Athens

(Excerpt)

Newssummary No. 23

Concerning: The Greek Merchant Fleet and England.

Source: Greek shipowner

Athens, 30 October 1939

A Greek shipowner reports that the Greek Prime Minister recently summoned him to his office simultaneously with all his colleagues.

The Prime Minister informed them that the English Government had requested him to place half the Greek Merchant Fleet at the disposal of Great Britain. He added that, in the name of the Greek Government, he had replied that, without violating their neutrality and incurring justifiable reproaches, it was not possible to requisition part of the private Greek Merchant Fleet for the use of a nation at war. However he nevertheless advised the shipowners present to give their services to England as far as they possible could and in a strictly personal manner.

.....

A certified true copy:

/s/ Dr. HORN
Attorney at Law

HO 790-0075

RIBBENTROP Exhibit No. 1258

COPY

557

from White Paper No. 7

No. 136

The Foreign Office to the German Ambassador at Athens

Telegram

Berlin, 24 August 1940

During his stay at Berlin, KYROU, the Greek Chief of Section, in a discussion with Ambassador CLODIUS on the 20th, was told that the fact that the greater portion of Greek tonnage is still sailing for England, is perhaps the most serious reproach we have to make to Greece. Juridical measures against this would not stand the test. We must expect that Greece would at once remove legal pressure on Greek seamen to sail to England and would forbid all voyages to England of ships flying the Greek flag, for which blockade declarations by Germany and Italy offer the best instrument. If on the other hand, the Greek Government maintains its present attitude, it might lead to more serious perils for the common interests of Greece than the temporary confiscation of ships belonging to Greeks living in foreign countries.

WEIZSAECKER

A certified true copy:

Dr. HORN

Attorney at Law

H0790-0076

H0790-0077

Ri-Exhibit No 260

5 f f

COPY

from Voelkischer Beobachter, Special Edition No 31a

(54th Year) Munich, Friday, 31 January 1941

.....

Perhaps they are counting on the Balkans. I wouldn't even give it much thought, since on thing is certain:

W e r e E n g l a n d w i l l a p p e a r , w e s h a l l a t t a c k h e r , a n d w e a r e s t r o n g e n o u g h t o d o s o.

Certified True Copy:

s/ Dr. HORN

t/ Dr. HORN

Attorney at Law

H0790-0078

RIBBENTROP Exhibit No. 259

COPY

from White Paper No. 7

No. 137

589 + 590

Notes concerning the reception of the Greek Ambassador at Berlin by the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs von RIBBENTROP, at Fuschl on 26 August 1940.

Fuschl, 27 August 1940

The Reich Foreign Minister told the Greek Ambassador that we classified the countries into those who were on the side of the Axis and those who were on the side of England. We considered Greece as a country which had decided in favor of England, for Greece had accepted the English guarantee, delivered war materials to the English and sailed with her ships into the English blockade zone. Besides we had other particulars also which gave us proof of Greece's pro-English attitude..... The attitude of the Axis towards the European countries would be determined by the attitude of those countries towards England during the fight for existence of Germany and Italy.

The Reich Foreign Minister could give Greece only one advice, first to adjust herself in her general policy to this situation, and secondly, as a result of this attitude, to put herself on the most friendly terms with the Italians and to agree with them. The Reich Foreign Minister emphasized to the Greek Ambassador that the Mediterranean was the sphere of interest of our Italian allies, that we were therefore not immediately interested, since however the Greek Government had asked the German Government for advice, the Reich Foreign Minister could only urgently advise the Greek Ambassador, with regard to the immediate as well as the distant future, to remedy the Italian grievances as soon as possible and to comply with a few of the Italians' wishes.....

SONNLEITNER

A certified true copy:

Dr. HORN
Attorney at Law

H0790-0079

Ri. Exhibit No. 261

541

Copy

From: White Paper No. 7

No. 33

The French Envoy in BELGRADE to the French Foreign Minister.

Telegram

No. 68 Belgrade, 4 February 1939

Continuation of my telegram No. 67

Mr. ZWETKOVITSCH, the resigning Minister of Labor, was requested by the PRINCE to form the new Government. .....

Mr. ZWETKOVITSCH was one of our best friends among the resigning members of the government.

BRUGERE

Certified true copy

s/ Dr. Martin HORN

t/ Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at Law

H0790-0080

Ri. Exhibit No. 262

591 /
593

Copy

from: Dokumente der deutschen Politik, Volume # I

No. 3a

From the Fuehrer's toast at the occasion of the supper tendered in honor of Prince Regent Paul in the New Reich Chancellery at Berlin on 1 June 1939.

Reply of the Prince Regent:

"The relationship between Germany and Yugoslavia, as well as the amicable contacts between them, have been conclusively determined for years because of a correct conception of the vital interests of the two neighboring nations. The auspicious fact that the economic structures of the two countries supplement each other has, beyond a doubt, had a substantial part in strengthening their friendship. This visit of mine is in any case a manifestation of the determined will of the Yugoslav people to live and cooperate with the German people in an atmosphere of peace and friendship. That is why I am very glad that the words of Your Excellency contained the solemn assurances, once more expressed, that the great German Reich also desires the establishment and strengthening of amicable cooperation with Yugoslavia, and that it intends to recognize Yugoslavia's liberty and independence as well as the same frontiers which have joined us, since last year, in permament neighborly feeling. I consider these statements not only important prerequisites for a favorable development of still closer ties between Germany and Yugoslavia, but also an invaluable contribution to the consolidation of peace in this part of Europe."

Certified True Copy:

s/ Dr. Martin Horn

t/ Dr. Martin Horn
Attorney-at-Law.

Ri. Exhibit No. 263

47

COPY

from: White Paper No. 7

No. 38

The French Military Attaché at Belgrade to the French Ministry of War.

Telegram

No. 85

Secret

Belgrade, 18 March 1939

The Chief of the Yugoslavian General Staff has delegated me to give the following information to General GAMELIN only.

1. In the event of war, Yugoslavia may possibly be forced to assume a friendly attitude towards Germany and Italy and possibly to supply even these countries. At first Yugoslavia would remain neutral in order to save her existence. At the proper time she would march with us.

.....

A certified true copy:

s/ Dr. Martin HORN

t/ Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at Law

H0790-0081

Ri: Exhibit No. 264

COPY

595

From White Paper No. 7

No. 51

The Supreme Commander of the French Army, General Gamelin to the French Ministerpresident, Defense and War Minister, Daladier.

SECRET

No. 126 - CAB/D.N.

Main Headquarters 27 November 1939

In telegram No. 9,177 of 23 November 1939, of which you have received a copy, our military attache at BELGRADE reports on the wishes of the Prince Regent and the Yugoslavian General Staff to bring about closer contact with our military attache. At the same time he reports the wishes of the Minister of War, to be permitted to send a Yugoslavian military mission to France.

- - - - - - - - - - - -

signed GAMELIN

Certified true copy.

/s/ Dr. M. Horn

Dr. Horn
Attorney at law

H0790-0082

H0790-0083

Ri. Exhibit No. 265

Copy

From the White-Paper No. 1

No. 52

The French Envoy at BELGRADE to the French Foreign Minister

Telegram

(Excerpt)

No. 938 Belgrade, 5 December 1939

..... If we wish to secure for our benefit a little order in this chaos which is spreading it is urgent that we consolidate through appropriate military agreements our position and our efforts on the Turkish as well as the Yugoslav side. From this viewpoint, there exists, in my opinion, a direct interest in the conferences which are being instituted at the present time, on the topic of armaments to be delivered by Yugoslavia as well as the possible working together of the two General Staffs.

BRUGÈRE

Certified True Copy:

s/ Dr. Martin HORN

t/ Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at Law

H0790-0084

Ri. Exhibit No. 266

COPY

597

from White-Paper No. 7

No. 53

Note of the Supreme Commander of the French Levantine troops, General WEYGAND, concerning on intervention of the Allies in the Balkans.

(Excerpt)

9 December 1939

Par. 2 .....

As matters stand now in Europe, only the Balkan theater of war can offer the possibility of favorable developments, whether it be through the attrition, which the opening of a new front would mean for the enemy, or whether through a successful outflanking attack on his vital points. .....

t/ WEYGAND

A certified true copy:

s/ Dr. HORN
t/ Dr. HORN
Attorney at Law

H0790-0085

Ri. Exhibit No. 267

COPY

598

from White-Paper No. 7

No. 56

Note of the Supreme Commander of the French Army General GAMELIN concerning the participation of Franco-British Forces in the operation in Finland.

(Excerpt)

Top secret

No. 104/i 10 March 1940

.....

Par. 3 In the military field an campaign in the Balkans would nevertheless be much more advantageous to France than one in Scandinavia. The theater of war would be enlarged to a great extent, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Greece and Turkey would bring us reinforcements of about 100 divisions. Sweden and Norway would only procure us the weak reinforcement of about 10 divisions. The strength of the troops which Germany would have to withdraw from her West front in order to proceed against our new undertakings would undoubtedly be in the same proportion.....

.....

signed M. GAMELIN

Certified true copy:

s/ Dr. HORN
t/ Dr. HORN
Attorney at Law

H0790-0086

Ri-Exhibit No. 268

544

Copy

from White Paper No. 7

No. 60

The French Military Attaché in Belgrade to the French Ministry of War

Telegram

(Excerpt)

Secret

08-09

Belgrade, 19 April 1940

Reply to No. 671/3 F.T.

1. Ever since I arrived from Paris, M. Grugère has been occupied with the question of cooperation, and he has talked with the Prince Regent and the Minister of War. He has obtained authorization to have a flying Officer of the Weygand Army put on detached service, so that he can secretly reconnoiter the airdromes and the Prince has decided to appoint a military attaché for the Ankara position who is to be charged with insuring liaison with General Weygand.

.....

Certified True Copy:

s/ Dr. Martin HORN

t/ Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at Law

H0790-0087

Ri.Exhibit No. 269

Copy

from White Paper No. 7

No. 67

The French Ambassador in Belgrade to the French Foreign Ministry.

Telegram

No. 697 - 698 Belgrade 11 June 1940

Paragraph 1 I naturally took up again with the Foreign Minister the question, which I had talked over a few days ago with the Prince Regent. I warned the Prince Regent of the moral support of our enemies to which Yugoslavia might be driven knowingly or unknowingly by the release of an obviously superfluous declaration of neutrality. The Minister assured me that his sentiments as well as those of his countrymen were too clearly on our side for him not to have to be painfully aware of the situation in which his country now is in.

Paragraph 2

He is counting on a possible change in the present situation, and in such a case Yugoslavia would hasten to come to our side.

Paragraph 3

The same impressions were found among the Yugoslava General Staff.

t/Brugère

A certified true Copy :

s/DR. MARTIN HORN
t/DR. MARTIN HORN

Attorney at Law

H0790-0088

Ri - Exhibit No. 270

c o p y

601

Extracts from S v e n H e d i n

"Amerika im Kampfe der Kontinente"

("America in the struggle of the continents")

F.A. Brockhaus, Leipzig 1942

8. Roosevelt and the second year of the war.

.....

Mr. William "Bill" Donovan went to the Balkans. He had the peculiarity to collect his information in the amusement establishements of the Balkan towns and he forgot his wallet, passport and interesting notes one day in a night-club.

Colonel Donovan, a particular friend of the American Secretary of the Navy Knox first got a clear rebuff in Sofia. He hoped to have an easier game in Belgrade, not with Prince Paul the Regent at that time, but rather with the group of Serbian officers and politicians who saw a field of activity in the resistance against the attempts for a New Order of the Axis powers, and who were not averse to the temptations of the dollar.

The Belgrade government received, as is now known, an American offer of guarantee in February 1941, which was denied by the White House later on. A few American broad-casting stations boasted also at the end of March that they had sent special daily broad-casts in the Serbian and Croatian languages during the past weeks, in order to incite the population of Yugoslavia to revolt and war against the Axis power. How much Roosevelt gambled with the fate of nations, to whom he had just as little to offer as Churchill, can be seen from an "Associated Press" report. It states, that the Yugoslavs would have to wait until spring 1942 for imports from the USA, because transportation difficulties and America's own shortage in war material did not permit aid at an earlier time.

H0790-0089

602

In the "Saturday Evening Post" (middle of May 1941) Demaree Bess, an American war correspondent occupied himself with America's part at the outbreak of the Balkan conflict in 1941. He states, that the USA government had directly intervened in it..... The Americans had been aware of German strength and they should have foreseen that Yugoslavia would be overrun. They had wanted, however, to play war politics. America was located too faraway from the Balkans to be able to extend active aid, and furthermore there had been no shipping space available for transports. Donovan is said to have stated in Belgrade that, if an agreement was concluded with Germany, the USA would consider Yugoslavia an enemy before and after the war, The USA-Ambassador Lane had unceasingly worked in the same direction. In this manner he had made himself popular in Washington, because diplomats who reported favorably on the Axis powers and Germany's strength, drew unfavorable attention in Washington.

.....

That Yugoslavia was encouraged in resisting Germany has not only been made public, however, by newspaper correspondents but also through the publication of the exchange of telegrams between President Roosevelt and the Belgrade government - soon afterwards the same took place with Athens - and through the reports of Col. Donovan himself, which were published by the "Washington Post" in March 1941. .....

Certified True Copy:

s/ Dr. Martin Horn

t/ Dr. Martin Horn

Attorney at Law

H0790-0090

Ri. Exhibit No. 271

COPY

603

from: Dokumente der deutschen Politik, Volume 9 I

The Balkan Campaign

Page 44
Paragraph I

..... So Yugoslavia received from the Soviet Government extensive deliveries of weapons; as terms Moscow requested in a typical manner solely to keep it secret as concerns Germany. When the Government of Zwetkowitsch in the winter of 1940/41 approached the Axis powers - - two German-Yugoslavian trade agreements were concluded on the 19th of October 1940 and a Hungarian-Yugoslavian friendship treaty on the 12thof December,this delivery of weapons was used from the Russian side as a political means of putting on pressure, by a delayed delivery of war materials.

Certified True Copy:

s/ Dr. HORN

t/ Dr. HORN

Attorney at Law

H0790-0091

Ri. Exhibit No. 272

C 0 4

C O P Y

from: Dokumente der deutschen Politik, Vol. 9/I

No. 53b

Note of the German Government to the Yugoslavian Government on 25 March 1941

Mr. Prime Minister:

" With reference to the conversations, which occurred in connection with the Yugoslavian entry into the Tri-Partite Pact, I have the honor to confirm to Your Excellency herewith in the name of the Reich Cabinet (Reichsregierung), that in the agreement between the Axis powers and the Royal Yugoslavian Government, the governments of the Axis powers during this war will not direct a demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of troops through Yugoslavian national territory.

Permit me, Mr. Prime Minister, to express the assurance of my highest respects."

s/ JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP

Certified True Copy

s/ Dr. MARTIN HORN
Dr. MARTIN HORN
Attorney at Law.

H0790-0092

Re-Exhibit No. 273

COPY

605

from: Dokuments der deutschen Politik, Volume 9 X

No. 53 c

Note of the Reich Cabinet to the Yugoslavian Cabinet

of 25 March 1941

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

With reference to the talks which took place at the occasion of Yugoslavia's adherence to the Three-Power Pact today, I have the honor to confirm herewith to Your Excellency, in the name of the Reich Cabinet, that the governments of the Axis Powers and of the Royal Yugoslavian Government agree to the following points:

Germany and Italy, taking into regard the military situation, assure the Yugoslavian government that they will not, on their own initiative, lay claim to any military assistance, If the Yugoslav government should deem it in their own interest at any time to participate in military operations of the States who adhere to the Three-Power-Pact, then it will be left to the Yugoslavian government to arrive at the requisite military agreements with the States adhering to the Three-Power Pact.

In that I ask you to treat the above communication as strictly secret, and to publicize it only with the agreement of the governments of the Axis Powers, I avail myself of th is opportunity, Mr. Prime Minister, to again assure you of my high esteem.

(signed) Joachim von Ribbentrop

Certified True Copy:

s/ Dr. HORN

t/ Dr. HORN

H0790-0093

Ri. Exhibit No. 274.

C o p y

from: "Dokumente der deutschen Politik", Volume 9 I

No. 52

Protocol concerning the joining of the Three-Power Pact by Yugoslavia of 25 March 1941

The governments of Germany, Italy and Japan on one hand and the government of Yugoslavia on the other hand establish the following facts through their undersigned plenipotentiaries:

Article I

Yugoslavia joins the undersigned Three-Power Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan in Berlin, 27. Septeber 1940.

Article 2

Insofar as questions, which touch the interests of Yugoslavia, are handled by the joint technical commissions provided under Article 4 of the Three-Power Pact, representatives of Yugoslavia will also be called to attend the conference of the Commission.

Article 3

The wording of the Three-Power Pact is added in the form of an appendix to this protocol.

Certified True Copy

s/ Dr. HORN

t/ Dr. HORN

Attorney at Law

H0790-0094

Rim-Exhibit No. 75

C 07

COPY

from: Dokumente der deutschen Politik, Volume 9 I

Excerpt from

No. 18

Hitler's Address of 4 May 1941 to the German Reichstag in the Kroll Opera House at Berlin

p. 115, 2nd par.:

You will understand, my Deputies, that I left the beautiful city on the Danube with a truly happy feeling on this day, not only that a labor in the field of foreign policy, carried on for almost eight years, seemd to be crowned by success; no, I believe also that perhaps, at the last minute, German intervention in the Balkans might thereby have become wholy superflous.

.....

Certified True Copy:

s/ Dr. HORN

t/ Dr. HORN

Attorney at Law